

(ii) possesses scientific, medical, or technical expertise pertinent to some aspect of the investigation and analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena; and

(iii) has previously conducted research or writing that demonstrates scientific, technological, or operational knowledge regarding aspects of the subject matter, including propulsion, aerodynamic control, signatures, structures, materials, sensors, countermeasures, weapons, electronics, power generation, field investigations, forensic examination of particular cases, analysis of open source and classified information regarding domestic and foreign research and commentary, and historical information pertaining to unidentified aerial phenomena.

(C) The Secretary and Director may terminate the membership of any individual on the Committee upon a finding by the Secretary and the Director jointly that the member no longer meets the criteria specified in this subsection.

(3) CHAIRPERSON.—The Secretary and Director shall jointly designate a temporary Chairperson of the Committee, but at the earliest practicable date the Committee shall elect a Chairperson from among its members, who will serve a term of 2 years, and is eligible for re-election.

(4) EXPERT ASSISTANCE, ADVICE, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.—(A) The Committee may, upon invitation of the head of the Office, provide expert assistance or advice to any line organization designated to carry out field investigations or data analysis as authorized by subsections (d) and (e).

(B) The Committee, on its own initiative, or at the request of the Director, the Secretary, or the head of the Office, may provide advice and recommendations regarding best practices with respect to the gathering and analysis of data on unidentified aerial phenomena in general, or commentary regarding specific incidents, cases, or classes of unidentified aerial phenomena.

(5) REPORT.—Not later than December 31, 2022, and not later than December 31 of each year thereafter, the Committee shall submit a report summarizing its activities and recommendations to the following:

(A) The Director.

(B) The Secretary.

(C) The head of the Office.

(D) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(E) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(6) RELATION TO FACA.—For purposes of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), the Committee shall be considered an advisory committee (as defined in section 3 of such Act, except as otherwise provided in the section or as jointly deemed warranted by the Secretary and the Director under section 4(b)(3) of such Act.

(7) TERMINATION OF COMMITTEE.—The Committee shall terminate on the date that is six years after the date of the establishment of the Committee.

(m) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(3) The term “transmedium objects or devices” means objects or devices that are observed to transition between space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water, that are not immediately identifiable.

(4) The term “unidentified aerial phenomena” means—

(A) airborne objects that are not immediately identifiable;

(B) transmedium objects or devices; and

(C) submerged objects or devices that are not immediately identifiable and that display behavior or performance characteristics suggesting that they may be related to the subjects described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

SA 4282. Mr. MENENDEZ submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle F of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1054. COMBATING TRAFFICKING OF CUBAN DOCTORS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the “Combating Trafficking of Cuban Doctors Act of 2021”.

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Department of State’s 2020 Trafficking in Persons report ranked Cuba in Tier 3 and included evidence regarding Cuba’s foreign medical missions and the Government of Cuba’s longstanding failure to criminalize most forms of forced labor, specifically noting allegations that Cuban authorities coerced participants to remain in foreign medical missions by—

(A) “withholding their passports and medical credentials”;

(B) “using ‘minders’ to conduct surveillance of participants outside of work”;

(C) “restricting their movement”;

(D) “retaliat[ing] against their family members in Cuba if participants leave the program”; or

(E) “impos[ing] criminal penalties, exile, and family separation if participants do not return to Cuba as directed by government supervisors”.

(2) Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, the Government of Cuba has deployed approximately 1,500 medical personnel to at least 20 countries.

(3) The United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, in their letter to the Government of Cuba on November 6, 2019—

(A) noted reports of coercive labor practices through the Government of Cuba’s foreign medical missions;

(B) highlighted reports by Cuban medical professionals that they received regular threats from Cuban officials while working overseas, including sexual harassment of women; and

(C) expressed concern that the practices referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) constitute slavery and trafficking in persons.

(4) In 2019, the Government of Cuba maintained an estimated 34,000 to 50,000 medical personnel in more than 60 countries under conditions that represent forced labor, according to the Department of State.

(5) The Government of Cuba realized profits in excess of \$6,300,000,000 during 2018 from exporting the services of Cuban professionals, of which foreign medical missions represent the majority of the services and income.

(6) The term “severe forms of trafficking in persons” is defined under section 103(1)(B) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102(1)(B)) as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery”.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of Cuba subjects Cuban doctors and other medical professionals to state-sponsored human trafficking; and

(2) the Government of Cuba should immediately and transparently respond to requests for information from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children.

(d) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until the date specified in subsection (f), the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that—

(1) identifies the countries that are hosting Cuban medical personnel who are participating in foreign medical missions for the Government of Cuba;

(2) to the extent feasible, includes an estimate of—

(A) the number of Cuban medical personnel in each country; and

(B) the value of the financial arrangement between the Government of Cuba and the host country government;

(3) describes the conditions in each country under which Cuban medical personnel live and work; and

(4) describes the role of any international organization in each country hosting Cuban medical personnel.

(e) DETERMINATION ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING.—In each report submitted pursuant to subsection (d), the Secretary of State shall determine whether—

(1) the Cuban medical personnel in each country identified in the report are subjected to conditions that qualify as severe forms of trafficking in persons (as defined in section 103(1) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102(1))); and

(2) Cuba’s foreign medical missions program constitutes proof of failure to make significant efforts to bring the Government of Cuba into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons (as determined under section 108 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7106)).

(f) SUNSET.—The Secretary of State is not required to submit the report otherwise required under subsection (d) after the date on which the Secretary submits a second consecutive annual report under such paragraph that includes a determination under subsection (e) that Cuban medical personnel are no longer subjected to trafficking in persons.

SA 4283. Mr. MENENDEZ submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department

of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle F of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1264. REPORT ON AND DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EXPORTS BY THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress the following:

(1) A report on exports by the Republic of Turkey of unmanned aerial vehicles, including the Bayraktar TB2, that includes—

(A) an identification of the destinations and quantity of such exports since 2018;

(B) a description of any pending sale of unmanned aerial vehicles by the Republic of Turkey; and

(C) an assessment of whether Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles contain parts or technology manufactured by United States entities or affiliates.

(2) A determination with respect to whether exports of unmanned aerial vehicles by the Republic of Turkey constitute a violation of—

(A) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);

(B) any other applicable law; or

(C) United States sanctions policy.

(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SA 4284. Mr. SASSE (for himself, Mr. WARNER, and Mr. RUBIO) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title II, insert the following:

SEC. —. IMPROVEMENTS RELATING TO STEERING COMMITTEE ON EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS.

Section 236 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283), is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “may” and inserting “and the Director of National Intelligence may jointly”;

(2) in subsection (b), by—

(A) by striking paragraphs (3) through (8); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

“(4) Such other officials of the Department of Defense and intelligence community as the Secretary of Defense and the Director of

National Intelligence jointly determine appropriate.”;

(3) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as subsections (d) through (f), respectively;

(4) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

“(c) LEADERSHIP.—The Steering Committee shall be chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence jointly.”;

(5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (3)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) by striking “a strategy” and inserting “strategies”;

(ii) by inserting “and intelligence community” after “United States military”; and

(iii) by inserting “and National Intelligence Strategy, and consistent with the National Security Strategy” after “National Defense Strategy”;

(B) inserting in paragraph (3)—

(i) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by inserting “and the Director of National Intelligence” after “the Secretary of Defense”;

(ii) in subparagraph (A), by striking “strategy” and inserting “strategies”;

(iii) in subparagraph (D), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(iv) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F); and

(v) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:

“(E) any changes to the guidance for developing the National Intelligence Program budget required by section 102A(c)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(c)(1)(A)), that may be required to implement the strategies under paragraph (1); and”;

(vi) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated by clause (iv), by inserting “and the intelligence community” after “Department of Defense”;

(C) in paragraph (4), by inserting “and Director of National Intelligence, jointly” after “Secretary of Defense”;

(6) by amending subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (3), to read as follows:

“(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) The term ‘emerging technology’ means technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by the Secretary, including quantum information science and technology, data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, advanced materials, software, high performance computing, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, biotechnology, medical technologies, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.

“(2) The term ‘intelligence community’ has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).”;

(7) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by striking “October 1, 2024” and inserting “October 1, 2025”.

SA 4285. Mr. SCOTT of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following:

Subtitle H—Protecting Taiwan From Invasion

SECTION 1291. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act”.

CHAPTER 1—AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

SEC. 1292. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy of nearly 24,000,000 people and is an important contributor to peace and stability around the world.

(2) Section 2(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301(b)) states that it is the policy of the United States—

(A) “to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area”;

(B) “to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern”;

(C) “to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means”;

(D) “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States”;

(E) “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character”;

(F) “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan”.

(3) Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen as President of Taiwan in 2016, the Government of the People’s Republic of China has intensified its efforts to pressure Taiwan through diplomatic isolation and military provocations.

(4) The rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army and recent military maneuvers in and around the Taiwan Strait illustrate a clear threat to Taiwan’s security.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) both the United States and Taiwan have made significant strides since 1979 in bolstering their defense relationship;

(2) the People’s Republic of China has dramatically increased the capability of its military forces since 1979;

(3) the People’s Republic of China has in recent years increased the use of its military forces to harass and provoke Taiwan with the threat of overwhelming force; and

(4) it is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by anything other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area, and of grave concern to the United States.

SEC. 1293. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States and take such other measures as the President determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to secure and protect Taiwan against—

(1) a direct armed attack by the military forces of the People’s Republic of China against the military forces of Taiwan;